Retreat from Intermediate Scrutiny in Gender-Based Discrimination Cases by Crisci, George S.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 3
1982
Retreat from Intermediate Scrutiny in Gender-
Based Discrimination Cases
George S. Crisci
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
George S. Crisci, Retreat from Intermediate Scrutiny in Gender-Based Discrimination Cases, 32 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 776 (1982)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol32/iss3/6
RETREAT FROM INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION CASES
In two recently decided cases, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have altered its
standard of review of classiflcations based on gender. During the mid-1970s, such
classfications were reviewed under an "intermediate scrutiny" test. While sex was
not declareda suspect classflcation, the Court exaMined gender-based classfications
more closely than waspermissible under a "rationalbasis"test. This Note traces the
development of the "intermediate scrutiny" test and its elements. The 1981 cases of
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County and Rostker v. Goldberg, are
examined Though the Court claimed to have used an "'ntermediate scrutiny" test,
the Note concludes that the cases were decided under the more lenient "rational
basis"test. The Note argues that the effective result of Michael M. and Rostker will
be tacit judicial approval of virtually all gender-based discrimination under rational
basis review.
INTRODUCTION
GENDER-BASED' discrimination waned during the 1970's, de-
spite the rejection of the equal rights amendment and the re-
fusal by the Supreme Court to declare sex-based classifications as
"suspect."2 Opponents of such classifications were able to gain sig-
nificant advances through the courts under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 Prior forms of gender-
based discrimination were struck down in such diverse areas as
unequal Social Security benefits,4 the legal drinking age,5 and the
right to administer an intestate's estate.6 By the end of the 1970's,
1. One definition for "gender" is, simply, "sex," WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 944 (2d ed. 1934), and that synonymity suffices here. "Sex" is defined as "[tihe
sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female
organism; the character of being male or -female." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (5th
ed. 1979). "Discrimination" is defined as "[a] failure to treat all persons equally where no
reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored." Id. at
420. "Gender-based discrimination" is therefore defined throughout this Note as a failure
to treat all persons equally where no substantial distinction can be found between the sex
favored and the sex not favored. See infra notes 119-51 and accompanying text for the
discussion which argues that the distinction must be substantial to be legitimate.
2. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
3. Gender-based discrimination suits are brought against the federal government
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court applies the same
standard of review for such suits as those involving the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection clause. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
4. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
5. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
6. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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the Supreme Court of the United States had subjected gender-
based classifications in those areas to a closer scrutiny than that of
the rational basis test.7 The Court placed the burden of proving
the constitutionality of the classification on the party seeking to
uphold 8 it-a departure from the rational basis test, where the
opponents of the classification have the burden of proving that it
denies equal protection of the law.9
In two 1981 opinions the Court retreated from this stricter
standard, and placed the burden of proving the unconstitutional-
ity of the classification on those opposing it.' 0 In Michael M v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County,'1 the Court upheld a Califor-
nia statute making statutory rape a crime for men only. 2 In
Rostker v. Goldberg,'" decided a few months later, the Court up-
held the exclusion of women from draft registration.' 4 Both opin-
ions stressed the need for a higher level of deference to the
legislature,' 5 and eschewed the standard of review established in
the mid-to-late 1970's.
This Note asserts that these two cases mark a retreat by the
Court in gender-based discrimination cases. The Note analyzes
earlier cases, which used a stricter standard of review than that of
the rational basis test,16 in light of their precedential impact in
MichaelM '7 and Rostker.'1 This Note concludes that the Court's
method of analysis' 9 demonstrates a visible retreat from the
heightened scrutiny given to prior gender-based discrimination
cases. The result: diminution of constitutional equal protection in
gender-based discrimination cases.20
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION CASES: PAST AND PRESENT
Gender-based discrimination cases brought under the equal
7. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 106-18 & 128-51 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
11. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
12. Id. at 467.
13. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
14. Id. at 83.
15. 450 U.S. at 470; 453 U.S. at 64.
16. See infra notes 106-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 198-245 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 288-324 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 325-47 & 367-74 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 348-66 and accompanying text.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
protection clause2 1 historically were reviewed under the rational
basis test,22 but the Supreme Court in 1971 began to use a higher
level of scrutiny.23 The Court never formally adopted the strict
scrutiny test which is required for the review of suspect classifica-
tions.24 Rather, the Court has recognized what is characterized as
a "mid-level" scrutiny, under which the gender-based classifica-
tion must be shown to be substantially related to an important
governmental objective.25
Analysis of case precedent in this section is divided into two
parts. The first section describes the evolution of the present stan-
dard of review, from the rational basis test to the mid-level scru-
tiny test.26 The second section focuses on the development and
articulation of the present standard, and attempts to define "im-
portant governmental objective" 27 and "substantial relationship to
such an objective."'28
A. Evolution of the General Rule
1. Pre-1970's. Deferential Review
Gender-based classification cases before 1971 were treated
under the same rational basis test as those cases questioning the
constitutionality of economic regulations.2 9 Judicial deference to
legislative decisions lies at the heart of this test,30 as the following
rules demonstrate:
21. The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause states: "No state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
22. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. Although no majority opinion has
ever offered a justification for using intermediate scrutiny in reviewing gender-based classi-
fications, Justice Stewart, concurring in Michael M., advanced an interesting rationale:
The Constitution is violated when government, state or federal, invidiously
classifies similarly situated people on the basis of immutable characteristics with
which they were born. Thus, detrimental racial classifications by government al-
ways violate the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated. By
contrast, while detrimental gender classifications by government often violate the
Constitution, they do not always do so, for the reason that there are differences
between males and females that the Constitution necessarily recognizes.
450 U.S. at 477-78 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
25. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 29-73 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 78-118 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 119-51 and accompanying text.
29. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 608 (1978).
30. Id.
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1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the State the power to classify in the adop-
tion of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it
is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbi-
trary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who
assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.31
Gender-based classifications are upheld under the rational ba-
sis test "whenever they [are] rationally related to government pur-
poses reflecting the traditional views of the 'proper' relationship
between men and women in American society."' 32 In Hoyt v. Flor-
ida,33 the Court upheld a law which required males to file for an
exemption from jury duty but which automatically exempted wo-
men unless they waived the statutory exemption.34  Justice
Harlan, writing for the Court, said that women are "still regarded
as the center of home and family life," and therefore that it was
permissible for the state to statutorily exclude women from certain
civic duties unless each woman herself determined that she was
able to perform them.35 The state, in Hoyt, presented no evidence
which showed that the intent of the law was to either help house-
wives or to excuse women from jury duty to perform their more
"traditional" duties.
I In unsuccessfully urging the Court to strike down the statute,
the appellant initially argued that the statute was overinclusive,
and thus unconstitutional on its face. That is, all women were
31. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (citations
omitted).
32. L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW § 16-24, at 1060 (1978).
33. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
34. The suit was brought by a woman who was convicted by an all-male jury of killing
her husband. The claim was based on the equal protection clause and not on the sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury, since the sixth amendment had not yet been applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. (The, right to an
impartial jury was incorporated by the Supreme Court seven years later in Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)). When a later suit challenged a similar statute on a sixth
amendment claim, the statute was struck down. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
35. 368 U.S. at 62.
19821
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exempted, not just those with family responsibilities. 36 The stat-
ute also was alleged to be unconstitutional in its application since
the exemption in effect excluded women from jury service; rela-
tively few women ever waived the exemption.37 The Court held
that it was administratively convenient for the state to avoid indi-
vidual determinations concerning family responsibilities.38 The
Court further reasoned that the lack of women on jury duty over a
particular time period was the result of mere chance, not discrimi-
natory purpose.39 Thus, the statute was upheld under the rational
basis test.
2. 1971: Departure From the Rational Basis Test
The traditional deferential standard of review was modified in
1971, when the Court in Reed v. Reed40 unanimously struck down
an Idaho statute which favored males over females in the adminis-
tration of an intestate's estate.41 The statute established degrees of
entitlement by classifying persons based upon their relationship to
the intestate.42 Males were favored over females within each class
of entitlement.43
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 65.
38. Id. at 63.
39. Id. at 68-69.
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Id. at 77.
42. Before adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in 1971, IDAHO CODE § 15-312
(1948) stated:
Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be granted to
some one or more of the persons hereinafter mentioned, and they are respectively
entitled thereto in the following order:
1. The surviving husband or wife or some competent person whom he or
she may request to have appointed.
2. The children.
3. The father or mother.
4. The brothers.
5. The sisters.
6. The grandchildren.
7. The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.
8. Any of the kindred.
9. The public administrator.
10. The creditors of such person at the time of death.
11. Any person legally competent.
If the decedent was a member of a partnership at the time of his decease, the
surviving partner must in no case be appointed administrator of his estate.
Id., quoted in 404 U.S. at 72 n.2. The parties were the adoptive parents of a minor who
died intestate. They had separated prior to the child's death. 404 U.S. at 71.
43. IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948) provided that "[ojf several persons claiming and
equally entitled [under § 15-312] to administer, males must be preferred to females.
Id., quoted in 404 U.S. at 73.
[Vol. 32:776
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, identified two is-
sues: "whether a difference in the sex[es] . . . bears a rational re-
lationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced," and
"whether [the statute] advances that objective in a manner consis-
tent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause."44 The
first issue was decided in the state's favor. The purpose of the
statute was to reduce the probate court's workload by reducing
intrafamily disputes-an objective which the Court deemed to be
"not without some legitimacy." 4 The second, more important46
requirement was not satisfied. Purporting to apply the rational
basis test,47 the Court noted that persons in each class were
equally entitled under the Idaho probate statutes to administer an
estate, and that the preference was merely a "modifying appen-
dage."'48 Greater entitlement based merely on sex, therefore, was
an arbitrary distinction unrelated to a determination of entitle-
ment based upon relationship to the intestate. Thus, the statute
violated the equal protection clause notwithstanding its objective
of avoiding probate disputes.49
Although the Court in Reed had intended to apply the rational
basis test,50 the Idaho statute actually was examined under a
stricter standard.5 A classification is deemed constitutional under
a rational basis test "if any state of facts [which] reasonably can be
conceived [by the court] that would sustain it." 2 The rational ba-
sis test would not require the state to justify the classification, nor
demonstrate that the classification is rationally related to any pur-
pose stated in the statute or reasonably obvious from reading the
statute.5 3 Application of the rational basis test would require judi-
cial deference to the Idaho legislature's preference for male ad-
ministrators.54 Here the Court held that the statutory intent was
44. 404 U.S. at 76.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920)). The Court
held that "a classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
48. Id. at 77.
49. Id. at 76-77.
50. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
51. J. NOWAK, supra note 29, at 613; L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-25, at 1063; and
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1972).
52. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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to award the administration of the estate to that person most
closely related to the intestate.5 A preference based on sex is not
rationally related to this purpose since a female is no less related
to the intestate than a male of the same class. The Court held the
statute to be arbitrary, therefore, because the classification was un-
related to an objective determined by the Court-not because the
classification was unrelated to any reasonably conceived objective.
If the Court had hypothesized some unstated purpose for the
unequal treatment, the statute should have been upheld. The
preference could be based on the assumption that men are better
qualified to administer an estate than women. Using the Hoyt ra-
tionale regarding the proper relationship of the sexes, the prefer-
ence for males would be arguably related to the statute's
purpose.16 Traditionally, most women had performed household
duties while men handled complex financial matters; therefore,
the legislature could have reasonably concluded that with all other
matters equal, a male is more qualified to administer an estate
than a female.
The use of a rational basis test shields the preference from at-
tack. If the preference is challenged as underinclusive (since not
all females are given less preference), the response is that the legis-
lature has determined that closeness to the intestate, rather than
sex, should be the primary factor in choosing an administrator. If
the statute is challenged as overinclusive (since many females are
in fact well qualified to handle such matters), the response is that a
general rule favoring males is administratively convenient.
But the Court did not attempt to hypothesize a constitutional
basis for the statutory preference grounded on the traditionally
"proper" relationship between the sexes-a theory that had often
been used in the past to uphold other gender-based classifica-
tions.57 Instead, the Court determined the "true" purpose of the
probate statute and found the preference of males over females to
be unrelated to that purpose.58 Reed may be interpreted, there-
55. The Court noted:
The objective of§ 15-312 clearly is to establish degrees of entitlement of vari-
ous classes of persons in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds of rela-
tionship to the intestate. Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the
enumerated classes of that section are similarly situated with respect to that
objective.
404 U.S. at 77. This same purpose had been asserted by the Idaho Supreme Court. 93
Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
56. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
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fore, as the first case to require greater, though yet undefined,
scrutiny in reviewing gender-based classifications. 59
3. Mid-1970"s: Approaching the Strict Scrutiny Test
Frontiero v. Richardson6' nearly declared sex a suspect classifi-
cation. In Frontiero, the Court struck down a federal law which
prevented a female military officer from claiming her husband as
a "dependent" unless she proved that the husband was actually
dependent upon her for over one-half of his support. The law did
allow, however, a male officer to claim his wife as a dependent
irrespective of her actual financial dependence upon him.61 This
denial prevented a female officer from obtaining increased hous-
ing and medical allowances.6 2 A four-judge plurality found im-
plicit support from Reed for the proposition that gender-based
classifications are not to be reviewed under the rational basis
test.63 The Court held that "[Cilassifications based on sex. . . are
inherently suspect, and must therefore -be subjected to strict judi-
cial scrutiny."6 Frontiero is the only case which has hinted that
gender-based classifications are to be subjected to a strict scrutiny
standard of review. That, and the lack of majority support,65
59. See Gunther, supra note 51, at 33-34.
60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
61. Id. at 679.
62. Id. at 680. Increased living quarter allowances are allowed under 37 U.S.C.
403,410 (1976), and increased medical and dental benefits are allowed under 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1072, 1076 (1976). When Frontiero was decided in 1973, 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) read thus:
'Dependent' with respect to a member.., of a uniformed service, means-
(A) the wife;
(C) the husband, f he is infact dependent on the member. . .for over one-half
of his support....
and 37 U.S.C. § 401 read as:
In this chapter, 'dependent,' with respect to a member of a uniformed service,
means-
(1) his spouse;
However, a person is not a dependent of a female member unless he is in fact
dependent on her for over one-half of his support ....
411 U.S. at 679 n.2 (emphasis added).
63. [The contention] that classifications based upon sex. . are inherently sus-
pect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. . . .find[s] at least
implicit support... in our unanimous decision... in Reed v. Reed. ... [I]n
reaching [its holding], the Court impliety rejected [the state'sJ apparently rational
explanation of the statutory scheme .... This departure from 'traditional' ra-
tional-basis analysis with respect to sex-based classifications is clearly justified.
411 U.S. at 682-84 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 688.
65. Compare Reed with Weisenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.NJ.
1982]
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makes the precedential value of Frontiero questionable. 66
4. Present Rule. Intermediate Scrutiny
The Court developed the present standard of mid-level review
gradually.67 This mid-level standard of review was first articu-
lated in Craig v. Boren,68 where the Court struck down an
Oklahoma law which allowed women to drink 3.2% beer at age
18, but prohibited males from such activity until age 21.69 The
Court, using the Reed standard,70 held that "tlo withstand consti-
tutional challenge. . . classifications by gender must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives. ' 71 Craig v. Boren was a clear
retreat from the strict scrutiny standard advanced in Frontiero,72
but it did require a greater level of scrutiny than that of the ra-
tional basis test.73
B. Elements of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
Cases decided after Craig v. Boren articulated the specific re-
quirements for satisfying the mid-level standard of scrutiny.
These cases consistently hold that the courts will not use the ra-
tional basis test when reviewing gender-based! classifications.74
Gender-based classifications which arguably serve legitimate gov-
ernmental interests have been struck down when those interests
1973), aft'don other grounds, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (The district court refused to apply the
strict scrutiny standard of Froniero to a gender-based classification).
66. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, agreed that
the federal statute violated the standard in Reed, but argued that declaring sex a suspect
classification was inappropriate because the equal rights amendment had been submitted to
the states for ratification. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart filed a concurrence which held that the statute "work[ed] an invidious discrimina-
tion in violation of the Constitution." Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's
concurring statement has been viewed by popular writers with some skepticism. See R.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 253-55 (1979).
67. See infra notes 74-126 and accompanying text.
68. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
69. Id. at 191-92.
70. Id. at 197.
71. The Court held that "[i]n Reed, the objectives of 'reducing the workload on pro-
bate courts,' and 'avoiding intrafamily controversy' were deemed 'of insufficient importance
to sustain the use of an overt gender criterion in the appointment of administrators of
intestate decedents' estates." Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 86-151 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 106-18 & 127-51 and accompanying text.
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are deemed to be unimportant.75 Other gender-based classifica-
tions which arguably bear a rational relationship to an important
governmental objective similarly have been struck down when a
substantial relationship did not exist.76
The distinction is that under the intermediate scrutiny test,
proponents of the classification bear the burden of proving that
the classification is constitutional.77 This burden of proof is not
satisfied by a bare assertion that the classification serves an impor-
tant governmental interest or that this interest is substantially re-
lated to the gender-based classification. 78 Rather, specific evidence
must be presented to substantiate the assertions of constitutional-
ity.79 The Court will not review such evidence at its face value,
but will conduct an independent judicial analysis.8 0 If such analy-
sis reveals that the burden of proof has not been met, the Court
will declare the gender-based classification unconstitutional.8'
Although the Court has consistentlybfollowed the intermediate
Craig standards since 1976, one area of uncertainty remains.
That is, the Court has never expressly overruled the pre-1976
cases decided under the rational basis test.8 2 Arguably, these cases
still stand as good law. 3 Continued reliance by the Court on
these rational basis cases in their later decisions has resulted in
confusing analysis and inconsistent results.8 4 This Note will ex-
amine those cases, and contrast them with later, intermediate stan-
75. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (administrative convenience
and certainty of result are not constitutional justifications for gender-based discrimination).
76. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (bare asser-
tion is not proof of a relationship between unequal workers' compensation benefits and an
important governmental interest in helping needy spouses whose husband or wife has
died).
77. See infra notes 106-18 & 127-51 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 110-11 & 134-40 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes I ll & 134-47 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 110 & 148-51 and accompanying text.
81. E.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
82. Since Fronilero contained no majority opinion, the case cannot be cited as prece-
dent. Therefore, one must go back to Reed for a working standard before Craig. While
Reed may constitute a departure from the rational basis test, see supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text, the opinion nevertheless asserts that the case was decided under the
rational basis test. For precedential purposes, therefore, Reed should be viewed as decided
under the rational basis test.
83. Attempts to overrule prior inconsistent standards have been made by individual
Justices. One example is Justice Stevens' concurrence in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 224 (1977), but none of these pre-1976 cases has been overruled.
84. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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dard cases.8 5
1. Proving the Existence of an Important Governmental
Objective8 6
A gender-based classification must serve an important govern-
mental objective to be constitutional.8 7 The standard from the
cases decided after the mid-1970's requires the classification's sup-
porters (the state) to present evidence of an important governmen-
tal objective served by the challenged statutory classification and
to prove that this objective is the actual legislative purpose under-
lying the use of the gender-based classification.88 Earlier cases,
however, indicate a more deferential approach.
a. Pre-1976: Judicial Deference. Kahn v. Shevin89 is an exam-
ple of judicial deference extended to unsupported state claims of
furthered governmental objectives through gender-based classifi-
cations. In Kahn, a Florida law gave a property tax exemption to
widows but not widowers.90 The state's claim that the statute was
designed to provide aid to women who are less able to support
themselves in later life because of past employment discrimination
practices91 was sufficient evidence to uphold the law.92 The stat-
ute presented evidence that women had been victims of past em-
ployment discrimination practices,93 but there was no indication
that the exemption was specifically designed to ameliorate that
past employment discrimination. Nevertheless, the Court simply
accepted the state's evidence that discrimination had in fact ex-
isted and assumed that the purpose of the exemption was to rem-
edy this problem.94 This assumption is ill-founded: the exemption
was first enacted in 1885, 9 5 and it is unlikely that the legislature
85. See infra notes 89-118 & 122-51 and accompanying text.
86. This discussion does not address the question of when a governmental objective is
constitutionally important, since the Supreme Court has always made such a determination
on a case-by-case basis without a working guideline or definition.
87. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
89. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
90. Id. at 352. The Florida statute which granted the exception read as follows: "The
following property shall be exempt from taxation: .... (7) Property to the value of five
hundred dollars to every widow. . . who is a bona fide resident of the state . FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 196.191 (West 1971).
91. 416 U.S. at 352.
92. Id. at 356.
93. Id. at 353-54 nn.5 & 6.
94. Id. at 353-54; Id. at 358-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 352. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1885) provided that: "There shall be exempt
[Vol. 32:776
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intended in 1885 to remedy past discrimination against females in
the job market.96
Schlesinger v. Ballard9 7 used a similar analysis. The Navy's
mandatory discharge requirements allowed female officers at least
13 years of commissioned service before mandatory discharge for
want of promotion.98 Male officers, however, were discharged if
they were passed over twice for promotion regardless of tenure.99
These requirements were upheld when it was alleged that without
such favorable treatment, female officers would be discharged
sooner than male officers °° because they were statutorily barred
from combat duty. 01 Female officers thus did not have the same
from taxation property to the value of two hundred dollars to every widow that has a
family dependent on her for support ... ." Id. at 352, n.1.
96. Any thought that the tax exemption was originally intended as a sympathatic ges-
ture toward women who were qualified for an occupation, but were discriminated against,
will be dispelled upon reading the 19th century's leading Supreme Court opinion on gen-
der-based discrimination in employment. The Court stated:
mhe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere
as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The
harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should be-
long, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. That is the law of the Creator.
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
97. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
98. 10 U.S.C. § 6401(a) (1967) (repealed 1980) provided that:
Each woman officer on the active list... appointed under section 5590 of this
title [officers in the Regular Navy], who holds a permanent appointment in the
grade of lieutenant ... shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal
year in which-
(1) she is not on a promotion list; and
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy
419 U.S. at 500 n.2 (emphasis added).
99. 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1967) (repealed 1980) provided that:
(a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy seiving in the grade of lieuten-
ant... shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which he is
considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the grade of lieutenant
commander... for the second time"....
(d) This section does not apply to womanofflcers appointed under section 5590
of this title ....
419 U.S. at 499 n.l (emphasis added).
100. Appellant was a lieutenant in the Navy who had been discharged after nine years
of active service for failing to be promoted for the second time. Id. at 499.
101. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1967) provided that: "[W]omen may not be assigned to duty in
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels of
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opportunity as male officers to compile favorable service records
and receive promotions.102 This inherent disadvantage, however,
does not prove that the statutory discharge scheme was designed
to remedy the discriminatory effect upon women. The Court ap-
pears to have conceived the objective itself,"0 3 using a traditional
rational basis test."° The legislative history, however, contradicts
the objective hypothesized by the Court. Mandatory discharge
procedures were retained in 1967, but compensation for disparate
treatment of female officers was rejected as a reason for such
retention. 105
In sum, both Kahn and Ballard were decided under a deferen-
tial standard of review. In each case, the classification's support-
ers presented evidence showing the existence of a serious problem
in need of a remedy. The classification's supporters, however,
failed to introduce any evidence that the gender-based classifica-
tion was created as a remedy to that particular problem. The
Court, despite this lack of evidence, reasoned that the legislative
objective was to remedy the problem demonstrated by the propo-
nent. Finally, the Court failed to weigh the legislative history be-
hind either classification. A reasonable analysis would have
demonstrated that the Court's assumptions were unwarranted.
b. The Present Requirements. More recent cases require the
party defending the classification to prove that an important gov-
ernmental objective exists.'0 6 This requirement was developed in-
itially in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld' 07-a case decided one term
after Kahn and only two months after Ballard. The Weisenfeld
Court held that it was unconstitutional to grant Social Security
survivor's benefits to a widow and her minor children, but to limit
the Navy other than hospital ships and transports." 419 U.S. at 508. The statute was
amended in 1978 to allow temporary assignment of women to vessels not expected to be
assigned combat missions. Pub. L. No. 95-485, 92 Stat. 1623 (1978).
102. The disparate treatment only applied to officers in the Regular Navy. Officers in
the Medical, Dental, Judge Advocate General's and Medical Services Corps were dis-
charged under gender-neutral rules. Id. at 509 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 5574, 5578, 5578a &
5579 (1967)).
103. The dissent made the same argument. 419 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
105. 419 U.S. at 515-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rlp. No. 676, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 10 (1967) reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 1839, 1839-42).
106. This requirement was reaffirmed in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981),
decided the same day as Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 465
(198 1). The Kirchberg Court held: "[tihe burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a
statute that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceedingly persua-
sive justification' for the challenged classification." Id. at 461.
107. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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the same benefits only to the minor children of widowers. 08 As in
Kahn and Ballard, the government attempted to "characterize the
classification. . as one reasonably designed to compensate wo-
men beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties which
still confront women who seek to support themselves and their
families."' 1 9 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, departed
from the deferential analysis evident in Kahn and Ballard, stating
that:
[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not
an automatic shield which protects against inquiry into the ac-
tual purposes underlying a: statutory scheme .... This Court
need not in equal protection cases accept at face value asser-
tions of legislative purposes when an examination of the legis-
lative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted
purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." 0
Thus, the Court struck down the statute when an independent in-
vestigation of the statutory scheme and the legislative history re-
vealed that the statute was intended to obviate the need for young
widowed mothers to work, but it was "in no way premised upon
any special disadvantages of women." '
108. Id. at 637-39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1967)). Title 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1967)
provides:
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother ... of an individual
who died a fully or currently insured individual, if such a widow or surviving
divorced mother-
(A) is not married,
(B) is not entiled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age insur-
ance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary insurance
amount of such individual,
(D) has filed applications for mother's insurance benefits ....
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such indi-
vidual entitled to a child's insurance benefit...
shall ... be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit for each month ... in
which she becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the
month preceding the first month in which any of the following occurs: no child of
such deceased individual is entitled to a child's insurance benefit, such widow or
surviving divorced mother become entitled to an old-age insurance benefit equal
to or exceeding three-fourths of the primary insurance amount of such deceased
individual, she becomes entitled to a widow's insurance benefit, she remarries, or
she dies ....
Id. Appellant was a widower who had depended on his wife for over half of the family
income, 420 U.S. at 639 n.4 Subsequent to his wife's death, appellant was unemployed for
a period of time. After obtaning employment, appellant was discharged, in part because
he was unable to find suitable housekeeping services for his infant son. Id. at 641 n.7.
109. 420 U.S. at 648.
110. Id. at 648 n.16.
11. Id. The Court gave the following reasons for its holding: 1) the Advisory Council
on Social Security created the survivor's benefits in 1939 "with the purpose of enabling the
widow to remain at home and care for the children;" 2) when suggestions were made in
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Justice Stevens, concurring in Cafifano v. Goldfarb, i12 persua-
sively argued that the requirement of an independent judicial in-
vestigation conflicted with the earlier holding in Kahn.'j1 Justice
Stevens further stated that since Kahn was overruled sub silen-
tio 114 the Weisenfeld analysis should be followed."15 It is unlikely
that the statute in Kahn would be upheld under the present rule.
The state failed to produce any evidence in support of its claimed
objective,' 1 6 and that in itself is enough to warrant a different re-
sult.11 7 Furthermore, an analysis of the legislative history raises a
question of whether the statute was actually intended to remedy
discrimination against women."18 Kahn, therefore, does not pro-
vide precedential support for the assertion that the burden of
proof is on the classification's opponents. Thus, the Weisenfeld
1971 to eliminate the gender-based distinction, the Advisory Council upheld the scheme
for the same reasons; 3) the benefits were not given to all widows--only those who had
minor children; 4) when all the children are no longer eligible for benefits, the widow's
benefits ceased until the widow reached the age of 60. Id. at 649-50.
112. 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
114. The rule of law in Kahn, that sex classifications made to ameliorate past sex-based
discrimination are not arbitrary, is arguably good law. It is only the implication that the
state is not required to prove the existence of this objective that Justice Stevens claims is
reversed.
115. 430 U.S. at 223-24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
117. That the Court has reviewed congressional power to remedy past discrimination
under a rational basis test is not a problem. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Even under a rational basis
test it is doubtful that the statute challenged in Weisenfeld would have been upheld if the
claims of remedial legislative purpose were taken at face value. In fact, the Court held that
the gender-based distinction was "entirely irrational." 420 U.S. at 651. This assertion is
supported in Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, which stated that the classification is
unconstitutional under a rational basis analysis. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Though Kahn represents a different factual situation, the statute challenged in Kahn would
probably not survive the standard of review under Katzenbach or Fullilove. In both Kat-
zenbach, which upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437
(1965) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-4 (1976)) and Fullilove,
which upheld the ten percent set-aside for minority business enterprises in the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977), the remedial
purpose of the legislation was clear from the face of the statute itself and its legislative
hisiory. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-17; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 456-67 (opinion of Burger,
C.J.). In other words, the important governmental interests test of the intermediate scru-
tiny standard had been met. The only judicial deference, therefore, involved the relation-
ship between the remedial purpose of the statute and the discriminatory classification.
Since the statute challenged in Kahn did not even meet the important governmental inter-
ests test, Kahn is distinguishable.
118. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. One could also logically argue that
the outcome in Schlesinger v. Ballard would be different because here the existence of the
objective lacked empirical support.
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analysis, which places the burden of proof on the proponents of
the classification, should be followed.
2. The Determination of a Substantial Relationshp
In addition to the burden of showing that an important gov-
ernmental objective was actually intended by the legislature, the
classification's supporters also bear the burden of proving the
existence of a substantial relationship between the governmental
objective and the gender-based classification. Some pre-1976
cases assume the existence of the relationship between the classifi-
cation and the stated objective.' 19 Other cases have upheld classi-
fications whose relationship with the state's asserted goal was
tenuous.120 Though these earlier cases were never expressly over-
ruled, recent cases have uniformly required the demonstration of
a much closer relati6nship,' 2' and thus should be followed.
a. Pre-1976 Cases. Earlier cases, like Kahn v. Shevin,122 pre-
sumed the existence of some relationship between the classifica-
tion and the statute's objective."2 The statute in Kahn was
arguably overinclusive since the exception was not limited to wid-
ows who deserved its alleged benefits.' 24  In Schlesinger v.
Ballard,125 the Navy's mandatory officer discharge policy was up-
held despite Congress' acknowledgement in 1967 that the excep-
tion would probably overcompensate in favor of female officers
for past gender-based discrimination. 26
b. The Present Rule. More recent cases require a much closer
relationship between the stated objective and the classification.
The burden is on the classification's supporters to present evi-
dence establishing a substantial relationship. 27 Furthermore,
such evidence is given little, if any, deferential treatment. 28
A gender-based classification will not be considered substan-
tially related to a statutory objective if a gender-neutral statute is
119. See, ,g., infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
120. See, ag., infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 127-51 and accompanying text.
122. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
123. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
126. Congress predicted that male officers would probably be discharged about two
years before female officers. Id. at 505 n. 11. The appellant was a perfect example of this
overcompensation. He was discharged after nine years of service as an officer, id. at 499,
four years before the thirteen year limit for female officers.
127. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
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equally effective in achieving the stated objective. In Orr v. Orr'2 9
an Alabama statute requiring husbands but not wives to pay ali-
mony upon divorce was struck down.' 30 The state claimed that
the alimony statute was designed to help needy spouses, and that
such disparate treatment was premised on the fact that the wife
was typically the needier spouse.13 1 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, acknowledged that "assisting needy spouses is a legiti-
mate and important governmental objective,"'132 but maintained
that the gender-based presumption was unnecessary since a hear-
ing on each spouse's financial situation was already required for
all divorce proceedings. 133
Should the classification's supporters establish that a gender-
neutral statute is not effective in achieving the governmental ob-
jective, they must additionally present empirical evidence to show
that the gender-based classification substantially furthers the as-
serted objective. Recent cases indicate that the Court's standard of
acceptable evidence is difficult to meet.
A bare assertion that such a relationship exists was found un-
acceptable by the Court in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance
Co. 134 There the Court struck down a Missouri workers' compen-
sation law which denied benefits to widowers unless dependent
upon the deceased spouse's earnings but granted benefits to a
widow without proof of dependency upon her husband's earn-
ings. 13  The Missouri Supreme Court held that the state's objec-
129. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
130. Id. at 271. The applicable statute provided that:
If the wife has no separate estate or if it be insufficient for her maintenance,
the judge, upon granting a divorce, at his discretion, may order to the wife an
allowance out of the estate of the husband, taking into consideration the value
thereof and the condition of his family.
If the divorce is in favor of the wife for the misconduct of the husband, the
judge trying the case shall have the right to make an allowance to the wife out of
the husband's estate, or not to make her an allowance as the circumstances of the
case may justify, and if the allowance is made, it must be as liberal as the estate of
the husband will permit, regard being had to the condition of his family and to all
the circumstances of the case.
If the divorce is in favor of the husband for the misconduct of the wife and if
the judge in his discretion deems the wife entitled to an allowance, the allowance
must be regulated by the ability of the husband and the nature of misconduct of
the wife.
ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51, 52, 53 (1975). The Alabama Supreme Court held that a husband is
not entitled to alimony upon divorce. Davis v. Davis, 279 Ala. 643, 189 So. 2d 158 (1966).
131. 440 U.S. at 280.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 281-82.
134. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
135. Id. at 143-47. The statute provided:
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tive was to provide benefits to needy spouses. 136  This goal was
furthered by the workers' compensation law since widows are typ-
ically in need of immediate payment of death benefits and are less
able financially, vis-a-vis widowers, to weather the long depen-
dency proceedings. 137  Citing Orr v. Orr,138 the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed that "[piroviding for needy spouses is surely an im-
portant governmental objective," and that "[i]t may be that there
is empirical support for the proposition" offered by the Missouri
Supreme Court. 139 The Court, however, struck down the statute
because "the bare assertion of this argument falls far short ofjusti-
fying gender-based classification . .. 4
The Court additionally refuses to find a substantial relation-
ship between the gender-based classification and the governmen-
tal objective when the classification is based on "archaic and
If the injury causes death, either with or without disability, the compensation
therefor shall be as provided in this section:
(2) The employer shall.. .pay to the total dependents of the employee a death
benefit on the basis of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the employee's average
weekly earnings during the year immediately preceding the injury ....
(4) The word "dependent" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean a
relative by blood or marriage of a deceased employee, who is actually dependentfor
support, in whole or inpart, upon his wages at the time ofthe injury. Thefollowing
persons shall be conclusively presumed to be totally dependentfor support upon a
deceased employee and any death benefit shall bepayable to them to the exclusion of
other total dependenis:
(a) A wife upon a husband legally liablefor her support, and a husband mentally
orphysically incapacitated/rom wage earning upon a wfe ....
Id. at 143-44 n.1 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979)) (emphasis added).
136. The Missouri Supreme Court held that "[tihe governmental objective was to re-
quire employers to alleviate the economic hardship resulting from a working spouse's
death." 583 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Mo. 1979).
137. The Missouri Supreme Court held:
The data available to the general assembly at that time no doubt supported the
concept that a widow was more in need of prompt payment of death benefits
upon her husband's death without drawn-out proceedings to determine the
amount of dependency than was a widower. It seems reasonably certain that dur-
ing the 1920's and 1930's [the statute was passed in 1925], it was more difficult
than now for a woman to obtain employment with substantial pay and very diffi-
cult for her when, upon her husband's death, she was suddenly thrust into the job
market. It seems rather obvious therefore that the purpose of the conclusive pre-
sumption of dependency was to satisfy a perceived need widows generally had,
which need was not common to men whose wives might be killed while working.
Id. (emphasis added). This passage supports the proposition that the Missouri Supreme
Court was using a rational basis test rather than an intermediate scrutiny standard. The
opinion implies that the legislature may have thought that widows were in greater need of
support, not that they actually thought so. Moreover, the "data available to the general
assembly" supporting the unequal treatment cannot be found in the opinion--suggesting
that data may not have been presented by the state.
138. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). See also supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
139. 446 U.S. at 151.
140. Id.
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overbroad generalizations" based on the traditional role of the
sexes in society. 141 In Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,t42 the unequal
distribution of Social Security survivors' benefits, based on the
concept that a male worker's earnings are vital to the support of
his family, while the female's earnings are not, was held unconsti-
tutional. 143 The Court held that the assumed value of the female
spouse's earnings was archaic and overbroad. The Court cited
sources which indicated that females constitute a large percentage
of the work force and do make significant contributions to the
family income. 144 The effect of this holding is to impliedly over-
rule Hoyt v. lBorida,145 which assumed that women would be too
busy raising a family to serve on a jury14 6 -an equally archaic
assumption in light of the large number of women in today's work
force.' 47 The inconsistencies between Hoyt and Weisenfeld indi-
cate that the Court no longer will use the rational basis test when
reviewing gender-based classifications, nor will it attribute a char-
acteristic commonly found in one gender to that entire gender. If
the government wishes to legislate regarding that characteristic, it
141. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 642-53.
144. Id. at 643 n.l1.
145. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
146. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
147. Wesenfeld actually dealt the final blow to Hoyt. Most of the damage, however,
had been inflicted two months earlier in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The
Court held that Louisiana's exemption of females from jury duty, which was similar to
Florida's, violated the sixth amendment. The State of Louisiana defended the exemption
by presenting the same argument that had prevailed in Hoyt. Id at 534, n.15. The Court,
however, started its attack on Hoyt by holding that Florida's exemption system was upheld
"on merely rational grounds," id. at 534, thus drawing the case into conflict with the inter-
mediate scrutiny test now used to analyze gender-based classification. The Court, focusing
on Louisiana's lack of support for the exemption, stated that "[i]t is untenable to suggest
these days that it would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury
service or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties." Id. at 534-35
(emphasis in original). Moreover, the Court cited evidence which showed the substantial
number of wives and mothers in the work force and claimed that "[t]hese stattiics...
certainly put to rest the suggestion that all women should be exempt from jury service
based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home." Id. at 535 n.17. The Court
concluded its analysis by stating that "[iJf it was ever the case that women were unqualified
to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required to perform jury
service, that time has long since passed." Id. at 537. The Court in Taylor, therefore, held
that Hoyt had been decided under a now unacceptable standard of review in gender-based
discrimination cases and that the exemption would not have survived even if the intermedi-
ate scrutiny test had been used. All that was left for the Court in Weirenfeld to do was
restate the obvious-that assumptions about the role of the sexes in society will not be
upheld if the evidence leads to a contrary conclusion.
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must draft a narrow statute that affects only those persons who
possess that particular characteristic.
Even if the classification's supporters are able to overcome the
first two obstacles, the Court may not be convinced that the evi-
dence shows a substantial relationship between the gender-based
classification and the governmental objective. When reviewing the
evidence presented by the classification's supporters, the Court
will make an independent evaluation of the substantiality of the
relationship. The Court in this situation grants little deference to
the legislature's determination. The State of Oklahoma, in Craig
v. Boren,148 presented a great deal of statistical evidence to sup-
port the state's position that an eighteen-year-old drinking age for
females and a twenty-one-year-old drinking age for males is sub-
stantially related to the goal of enhancing traffic safety.149 Rather
thati accepting the evidence at face value, however, the Court in-
dependently analyzed and refuted each piece of evidence, 15 0 and
concluded that "[Oklahoma's] statistics in our view cannot sup-
port the conclusion that the gender-based distinction closely
serves to achieve that objective and therefore the distinction can-
not . . . withstand equal protection challenge."'15 1
D. Conclusion
The Court has, since 1971, consistently subjected discrimina-
tory gender-based legislation to greater scrutiny than the rational
basis test would permit.' A gender-based classification now
must be substantially related to an important governmental objec-
tive.'5 3 The party defending the classification must now bear the
burden of proving the substantial relationship between the gov-
ernmental relationship and the challenged legislation. 154 To
prove the existence of an important governmental objective, the
government must show from the statute and from the legislative
history that the claimed objective was the actual purpose for the
classification. 55 Furthermore, to prove the substantial relation-
ship between the governmental objective and the gender-based
classification, the government must first prove that a gender-neu-
148. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
149. Id. at 199-201.
150. Id. at 210-14.
151. Id. at 200.
152. See supra notes 40-73 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 74-151 and accompanying texts
154. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
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tral statute will not be equally effective in achieving the desired
goal.' 56 To meet the burden of proof the government must show
that the gender-based classification is supported by more than
bare assertions 57 or "archaic and overbroad generalizations"
about the traditional role of sexes in society.158 Any empirical evi-
dence presented by the government must withstand an independ-
ent judicial evaluation. 59
II. THE 1981 CASES: QUESTIONABLE INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
A. Michael M. v. Superior Court160
The petitioner in Michael M., a seventeen-and-one-half-year-
old male, had engaged in sexual intercourse with'a consenting' 6'
sixteen-and-one-half-year-old female and was subsequently
charged with violating California's statutory rape law.162 The stat-
ute outlaws sexual intercourse with any female under the age of
eighteen, but contains no such prohibition against sexual contact
with a male of similar age.163 At trial petitioner moved for dismis-
sal, claiming the law violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Petitioner's motion was denied by both
the trial and appellate courts.'" The California Supreme Court,
using a strict scrutiny test, affirmed, holding that the state's
claimed objective for the statutory rape law, prevention of teenage
pregnancies, constituted a compelling state interest. 65 The court
held that because only women are capable of incurring pregnancy,
the classification was a justifiable means to separate offender from
156. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
160. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
161. The plurality implied that the incident was forceful by mentioning that the peti-
tioner had initially hit his female victim. Id. at 467. The trial record, however, clearly
showed that she willingly consented to sexual intercourse. Id. at 483-88 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
162. Id. at 466.
163. The California statutory rape law reads: "Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator where the
female is under the age of 18 years." CAL. PENAL CODa ANN. § 261.5 (West Supp. 1980).
The rape laws were amended in 1970, making them gender-neutral with the exception of
sexual intercourse with a minor female. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261 (West Supp. 1980).
164. 450 U.S. at 467.
165. Id.
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victim.166
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the peti-
tioner argued that the statute was unconstitutional for four rea-
sons. First, the state had failed to prove that controlling teenage
pregnancies was the important governmental interest served by
the statute. The petitioner claimed that the original purpose of the
statute was to regulate morality by protecting a young woman's
chastity, and not to control teenage pregnancies. 167 Since the state
law only protected the chastity of women in furthering the goal of
morality regulation, the statute was based on archaic generaliza-
tions about societal sex roles. 168 Second, petitioner argued that a
gender-neutral statute would have been equally effective in fur-
thering the state's asserted objective.1 69 Since a gender-neutral
statute was equally effective, the state could not show a substantial
relationship between the discriminatory statute and the important
governmental objective. Therefore, the statute was unconstitu-
tional notwithstanding any evidence presented by the state which
shows that holding only males liable, under the statute, is substan-
tially related to controlling teenage pregancies.170
Third, petitioner argued that the statute was overinclusive, be-
cause the statute also applied to females who are too young to
become pregnant. 17 ' This overinclusiveness arguably casts doubt
on the assertion that the statute's purpose is to control teenage
pregnancies. Petitioner's final argument was that since he was
under eighteen, the statute was unconstitutional as applied. By
not punishing females for having sexual intercourse with a minor
male, it improperly assumed that males are the aggressors in a
sexual relationship. 72 The Court rejected all of petitioner's argu-
ments and affirmed, 5-4. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion
held that the law passed the constitutional test articulated in Craig
v. .Boren.
173
166. Id.
167. Id. at 472 n.7. See also id. at 495 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Code
Commissioners' note, subd. 1, following CAL. PENAL CODE § 261, p. 111 (1st ed. 1872)).
168. Id. at 472 n.7. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
169. 450 U.S. at 473.
170. See generally supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (a discriminatory statute
is unconstitutional if a nondiscriminatory statute will accomplish the same purpose).
171. Id. at 475.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 469. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
1982]
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1. The Court's Reasoning: Intermediate Scrutiny?
In response to the petitioner's first argument, Justice Rehn-
quist held that the state had adequately shown the existence of an
important governmental objective. Citing evidence of the growing
problem of illegitimate teenage pregnancies and abortions, 71 Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that "the State has a strong interest in
preventing [illegitimate pregnancies].""' It was uncertain
whether this goal was the "actual" or "primary" purpose of the
statute,176 but the Court gave great deference1 77 to the finding of
the California Supreme Court that "the prevention of illegitimate
pregnancy is at least one of the 'purposes' of the statute.' 178 The
argument that the statute was originally enacted to protect the vir-
tue and chastity of young women, and was therefore invalid, was
dismissed in a footnote,179 in which the Court stated that the origi-
nal motive for the statute was irrelevant when examining its con-
stitutionality under the equal protection clause.' 80 Thus the Court
would "not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."' 81
The Court rejected the claim that a gender-neutral statute
would have been equally effective for two reasons. Kahn v.
Shevin 2 was cited for the proposition that it is not the Court's
function to determine the most effective method, provided the
method in question is within constitutional limitations. 183 In
other words, if the state can show a substantial relationship be-
tween the statute and the governmental objective, the statute is
constitutional regardless of the effectiveness of a gender-neutral
alternative. Furthermore, "the State persuasively contends that a
gender-neutral statute would frustrate [the State's] interest in ef-
fective enforcement. . .[because] a female is surely less likely to
report violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to
criminal prosecution."' 84 Since the effects of a change from a gen-
174. 450 U.S. at 470-71 nn.3-5.
175. Id. at 470.
176. Id.
177. Id
178. Id.
179. Id. at 472 n.7.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
182. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion on the method of analysis used in Kahn.
183. 450 U.S. at 473.
184. Id. at 473-74.
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der-based to a gender-neutral statute were speculative, it -was
proper to defer to the judgment of the state and its courts, who are
"armed.. . with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances
concerning the passage and potential impact of [the statute], and
familiar with the milieu in which that provision would
operate."' 8 5
The Court quickly dismissed petitioner's two remaining argu-
ments, that the statute was overinclusive, and that it was unconsti-
tutional as applied. That the statute also included prepubescent
females was considered constitutionally insignificant because "it is
ludicrous to suggest that the Constitution requires the California
Legislature to limit the scope of its rape statute to older teenagers
and exclude young girls."'8 6 In any event, the inclusion of young
females "could well be justified on the grounds that very young
females are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual
intercourse." '87 Moreover, the statute did not presume that males
are the aggressors in a sexual relationship. It was merely an at-
tempt to prevent teenage pregnancies by providing an additional
deterrent for men.188
At the end of his opinion, Justice Rehnquist seemed to dis-
tinguish Michael M from past cases which had struck down gen-
der-based classifications. In Michael M. the person alleging the
statute to be discriminatory was male. Justice Rehnquist claimed
that the statute simply imposed a greater burden on males and,
therefore, did not invidiously discriminate against females. 8 9 He
further stated that the special constitutional protection afforded
females should not be extended to males, since males have suf-
fered no historical disadvantages." 9 Finally, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the sexes are not similarly situated in this instance
because only women become pregnant and suffer the physical and
emotional damages resulting from pregnancy. Thus, by holding
only males liable the statute attempts to equalize the su.ffering. 191
Justice Brennan, in a heated dissent, rebuked the plurality's
application of the Craig v. Boren standard. 92 Justice Brennan ar-
gued that the plurality had placed too much emphasis on whether
185. Id. at 474 n.10 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967)).
186. Id. at 475.
187. Id. (citing Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (lst Cir. 1979)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 475-76.
190. Id. at 476.
191. See id. at 471, 476.
192. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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the goal of preventing teenage pregnancies is constitutionally im-
portant.193 In his view, the state must also prove that the asserted
objective is the actual purpose for the statute and that the statute
substantially relates to that objective.' 94 Justice Brennan found
no evidence in the statute or legislative history to show that the
purpose was to control teenage pregnancies.1 95 Furthermore, the
state had failed to show that a gender-neutral statute would not be
as effective as the current gender-based one. 196 Finally, Justice
Brennan found that the statute had little, if any, actual impact
upon the teenage pregnancy problem. 197
2. Anaosis of the Court's Reasoning: Intermediate Scrutiny in
Name But Not in Fact
Justice Brennan's analysis in MichaelM. is in accord with pre-
cedent. The only aspect of the intermediate scrutiny test applied
correctly by the plurality was the determination that the frequency
of teenage pregnancies is a serious problem in need of a solution.
The balance of the plurality analysis does not follow prior
precedent.
An examination of the statute and its legislative and judicial
history clearly demonstrates that the statutory rape law was en-
acted to regulate morality by protecting the chastity of teenage
females.' 98 The State of California failed to present any evidence
in either the Supreme Court of the United States or the California
Supreme Court that a gender-neutral statute would be less effec-
tive in controlling teenage pregnancies. 199 Furthermore, the state
legislature failed to draft a narrow statute covering only those fe-
males who are physically able to become pregnant.2" The stat-
ute's presumption that males are the aggressors during sexual
activity is an archaic generalization about the role of the sexes in
society, and is unconstitutional. 20 ' Finally, the evidence cited by
both the plurality and the dissent shows that the statute has had
little impact on the problem of teenage pregnancies.
2 2
193. 450 U.S. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 489 n.2.
195. Id. at 494-96.
196. Id. at 491-94.
197. Id. at 493 n.8.
198. See infra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 231-32.
201. See infra text accompanying note 233.
202. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
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a. Important Governmental Objectives Analysis. The state
bears the burden of proving that a statute serves an important
governmental objective."0 3 In Michael A., however, California
failed to carry the burden of proof that the statute was designed to
control teenage pregnancies. That objective is found in neither
the statute nor the legislative and judicial history. Moreover, the
evidence which the plurality asserts as dispositive of petitioner's
argument 2°4 only demonstrates that a large number of teenage
pregnancies and abortions occur.2"'
No evidence of a purpose to control teenage pregnancies is
found on the statute's face. Section 261.5 of the California Penal
Code simply states: "Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sex-
ual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years. 2 0 6
The statute does not mention teenage pregnancies or the control
thereof. Moreover, prior to 1970, section 261.5 was a part of the
general definition of rape under section 261.207 That section lists
the activity described in section 261.5 plus five other circum-
stances which constitute rape. 2 8 The five other circumstances all
involve one element-a female victim who is unable to consent to,
or who has resisted, the sexual activity. Logically, therefore, sex-
ual activity with a female under the age of eighteen was prohib-
ited because the state legislature thought such a female incapable
of giving her consent. In other words, the purpose of the original
section 261, including what is now section 261.5, was to protect
203. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
204. 450 U.S. at 472 n.7.
205. Id. at 470-71 nn.3-5.
206. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261.5 (West Supp. 1980).
207. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261 (West 1970).
208. The statute read as follows:
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife
of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances:
1. Where thefemale is under the age of eighteen years;
2. Where she is incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness of mind,
whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent;
3. Where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence;
4. Where she is preventedfrom resisting by threats of great and immediate
bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, or by any intoxicating
narcotic, or anaesthetic substance, administered by or with the privity of the ac-
cused;
5. Where she is at the time unconscious to the nature ofthe act, and this is
known to the accused;
6. Where she submits under the belief that the person committing the act is her
husband, and this belief is induced by the artifice, pretense, or concealment prac-
ticed by the accused, with intent to induce such belief.
Id. (Emphasis added).
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women who did not grant consent to the sexual activity, and not to
control teenage pregnancies.
The California legislature's inconsistent attitude toward minor
males and females was evident in 1970, when it amended section
261 by substituting a gender-neutral definition of rape. At that
time, sexual activity with a female under the age of eighteen was
the only circumstance listed in the old section 261 that was not
reclassified in gender-neutral terms.20 9 That type of sexual activ-
ity, instead, was removed from section 261 and shifted into a sepa-
rate section, section 261.5.21 That shift suggests that the
legislature determined that only females were incapable of con-
senting to sexual activity, thus needing the state's protection.
An analysis of the statute's legislative history does not refute
this conclusion or indicate that the control of teenage pregnancy is
the statute's actual purpose. California's first statutory rape law
was passed in 1850, well before teenage pregnancy was recognized
as a problem.21' The present statute was enacted in 1913, well
before the frequency of teenage pregnancies became significant.
2 12
Furthermore, the original statute only prohibited sexual inter-
course with females under the age of ten years, thus applying only
to women who were physically incapable of pregnancy.
2 13
Additionally, the only written legislative history on the statute
indicates that it was based on a legislative determination that fe-
males below a certain age were incapable of consent. 214 There is
no evidence in the written history to show that control of teenage
pregnancies was also an objective.215 Thus, the legislature when
209. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261 (West 1970) with CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 261 (West Supp. 1980).
210. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 261.5 (West Supp. 1980).
211. 450 U.S. at 469 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 495 n.9.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. Even if the statute had been passed to control teenage pregnancies, it is still
not certain that the statute would be constitutional. It is possible, as Justice Brennan's
dissent indicated, that the statute would be struck down on substantive due process
grounds. Id. at 491 n.5. The use of contraceptives is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). A woman also has a right to choose an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). These rights have been subsequently extended to minors. See Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (prohibition on sale or distribution of contraceptives to
minors under 16 was struck down); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(provision requiring unmarried woman under 18 to obtain either parental consent or con-
sent from a person in loco parentis to obtain an abortion was struck down). If a minor
female has a fundamental right not to become pregnant by using contraceptives, and has a
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considering this legislation did not regard the control of teenage
pregnancy as an objective.
Judicial interpretation of the statute is also of little aid to the
state's argument. As Justice Brennan's dissent points out, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court had never, before Michael M., interpreted
the statute as a legislative attempt to control teenage
pregnancies.216 For the previous 130 years the statute had been
consistently interpreted to be a legislative attempt at protecting
females considered incapable of intelligently consenting to sexual
intercourse.217
Statutory and historical analysis illustrates that the statute was
intended to protect only females deemed legally incapable of con-
senting to sexual activities because of age, and not to control teen-
age pregnancies. 218  Extending legislative protection to females
assumes that males of the same age are capable of consenting and,
therefore, are not in need of the state's "protection." This objec-
tive is based on the notion that protection of a young woman's
chastity is more important than the protection of a young man's,
since a young woman is incapable of realizing the consequences of
her sexual activities while a similarly situated male can.21 "9 The
corresponding right, by obtaining an abortion, not to bear a child once becoming pregnant,
then it seems logical that this same minor has a right to perform the very activity which
gives rise to the use of contraceptives and subsequently abortion--the right to engage in
sexual activity. By imposing criminal sanctions on any male who participates with a minor
female in sexual activities, the state is attempting to effectively deny the minor female her
rights by deterring males from engaging in sexual activity with her. While a minor's rights
can be subjected to greater restrictions by the state than can those of adults, the plurality
incorrectly implies that these rights may be completely denied. 450 U.S. at 472-73 n.8.
The determination of whether a minor is mature and capable of asserting those rights must
be done on a case-by-case basis, not by legislative generalizations. See Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979).
216. Id. at 496 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 495-96 n.10 (quoting People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 214-15, 39 P.
607, 608-09 (1895) (" 'The obvious purpose of [the statutory rape law] is the protection of
society by protecting from violation the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls.' ")); Peo-
ple v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1964)
("The under-age female 'is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the implica-
tions and nature of her act.' ").
218. See supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
219. As Justice Brennan's dissent noted, the California Supreme Court has aggravated
the situation by elevating the notion of incapability of females and the capability of males
into an irrebutable presumption:
[E]ven in circumstances where a girl's actual comprehension contradicts the
law's presumption [that a minor female is too innocent and naive to understand
the implications and nature of her act], the male is deemed criminally responsible
for the act, although himself young and naive and responding to advances which
may have been made to him.
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fact that sexual mores have changed since 1850, or even 1913, re-
quires no explanation.
The plurality's decision to accord the legislature deference in
ascertaining the statute's objective creates serious difficulties. The
burden of proof in prior cases had fallen upon the state, but by
according deference to the legislature the plurality, by implication,
shifts the burden to the statute's opponents. Moreover, the plural-
ity's support220 is questionable as the majority of the cases cited
for the judicial deference shown to legislative determinations were
decided prior to the present rule's formulation.22' Since the pres-
ent rule does not allow such deference, the value of the cases cited
by the plurality is questionable.
b. The Substantial .Relationshop Test. Even assuming that the
purpose of the statute is to control teenage pregnancies, the state
still had the burden of showing a substantial relationship between
the statute and the objective. The evidence cited in Justice Bren-
nan's dissent indicates that this relationship did not exist.
The state had the burden of proof in demonstrating that a gen-
der-neutral classification would not be equally effective in achiev-
ing the statute's objective.222 California asserted that a gender-
neutral statute was not as effective; however, it failed to substanti-
ate those assertions with supporting evidence.223 The "knowledge
of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and poten-
tial impact of [a gender-based versus gender-neutral statute]" 4
which the plurality opinion asserts that the California Supreme
450 U.S. at 488 n.l (quoting People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 674,
39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1964) (footnote omitted)).
220. 450 U.S. at 469-70.
221. Id. at 469-70. Those cases cited by the plurality appear to have been incorrectly
applied. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1970), held that courts should avoid inquiries
into the congressional motives. Id. at 224. That case, however, involved a legislative act
whose passage was allegedly motivated by discrimination but whose effect was nondiscrim-
inatory. The discriminatory effect in Michael M. is obvious: males are prosecuted and
females are not. Another case, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), did state that determining legislative purposes is difficult, id. at 265 n. 11 (quot-
ing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973)), but the Court inquired into legisla-
tive "purpose" only to determine whether the legislature intended to discriminate in passing
a statute. The Court was not concerned with any important, or even legitimate reasons for
the statute. Moreover, Arlington Heights involved the determination of the discriminatory
intent of a statute which was not discriminatory on its face. The statute in Michael M,
however, is facially discriminatory; therefore, the plurality's "difficult inquiry" into legisla-
tive purposes is unnecessary, because the problem does not exist.
222. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.
224. 450 U.S. at 474 n.10 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967)).
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Court possessed, does not appear in either opinion.225 In fact, the
evidence tends to refute the state's assertion, since gender-neutral
statutory rape laws exist in thirty-seven states-with three states
also prosecuting minors of both sexes.226 California never
presented any enforcement problems with gender-neutral laws to
the Court.227 Furthermore, it is doubtful that minor females
would be any more willing to report violations under a gender-
neutral statute since the activity is usually consensual, not
forceful.22
8
The plurality opinion asserts that the Court should not involve
itself in a "choice of means" analysis but need only determine
whether the statute itself is constitutional.229 As discussed above,
it is doubtful that such an aspect of Kahn, the Court's support for
the above proposition, possesses any force as precedent.230
The plurality also incorrectly asserted that the statute was not
overinclusive. If California wishes to base its statutory rape law
on a characteristic peculiar or common to one sex, it should draft
the statute narrowly enough to affect only those who possess that
characteristic. 23' California should have drafted its statutory rape
law to apply only to females who were physically capable of preg-
nancy, if the objective of the statute was to control pregnancies.
The plurality may be correct in asserting that prepubescent fe-
males should be included under the statute to protect them from
serious physical injury,2 32 but no such purpose is found in the stat-
ute, and the California Supreme Court failed to advance this ob-
jective in its opinion. Since no evidence of this objective is
advanced, the protection of prepubescent females fails the inter-
mediate scrutiny test.
The plurality's conclusion, that the statute does not assume
225. A reading of the California Supreme Court's opinion indicates that the legislature
never made such a determination when it enacted the statute, and the Court was merely
hypothesizing that such a result would occur.
[The Legislature may well have believed that the criminal prosecution of a minor
female equally with a male would, as a practical matter, effectively eliminate any
possibility whatever of prosecution under the statute. A potential prosecutrix, or
her family, would be unlikely ever to complain if she would herself be subject to a
prosecution on identical charges.
25 Cal. 3d 608, 614, 601 P.2d 572, 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (1979)(emphasis added).
226. 450 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 492-93.
228. Id. at 493 n.7.
229. 450 U.S. at 473.
230. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
232. 450 U.S. at 475.
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that males are aggressors, but is merely a device to deter males
from engaging in sexual activities, is questionable. If the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions is intended to deter sexual activity, and
thus pregnancies, holding only one of the two consenting partners
criminally liable implies that one party is somehow more blame-
worthy than the other. Prosecuting the male makes him the statu-
tory "aggressor," and the female the statutory "victim. '2 33
Given the evidence found in both the plurality opinion and the
dissent, th, statute bears little relationship to controlling teenage
pregnancies, since the effect on the problem appears to be virtu-
ally nonexistent. Over 50,000 teenage pregnancies, and a like
number of teenage abortions, occurred in California in 1978.34
In that same year, however, only 400 males were arrested for stat-
utory violations.235 Based on these figures the statute appears to
be an ineffective deterrent to teenage sexual activity.
c. Gender-Based Discrimination Against Males. The plurality's
distinction between Michael M and past gender-based discrimi-
nation cases because the discrimination is directed against males is
erroneous. To say that the standard of review in cases involving
discrimination against males is different from the standard of re-
view in cases involving discrimination against females is a blatant
disregard of precedent. This assertion expresses the proposition
that a rational basis test is permissible in male discrimination
cases. Support for this proposition, however, is not found in the
plurality opinion.23 6 On the contrary, the Court has frequently
applied the same standard to both males and females.2 7 Craig v.
Boren,238 the decision which established the present intermediate
scrutiny standard for gender-based discrimination cases, applied
the same standard to males and females. Craig involved a male
who claimed his equal protection rights had been violated. 9
Thus, the plurality cannot review male and female discrimination
233. See supra text accompanying note 219.
234. 450 U.S. at 471 n.5
235. See id. at 493 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 476.
237. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (mothers, but not fathers, of
illegitimate children granted right to block adoption by withholding consent); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony obligations on husband but not on wife); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (separation of an illegitimate child from surviving father but not from
surviving mother without a showing of parental unfitness).
238. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
239. Id. at 192.
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cases differently, unless it reverses Craig and other inconsistent
cases.
That only females can become pregnant does not, as the plu-
rality claims, necessarily make the sexes dissimilarly situated.
Reed v. Reed2 4 ° enunciated the standard that gender-based classi-
fications would be unconstitutional if the sexes are "similarly situ-
ated with respect to [the statutel."24 1 This rule implies that
different characteristics between males and females alone do not
automatically validate a discriminatory statute. The statute itself
must affect the sexes differently. When the objective of the statute
is to curb teenage pregnancies, then the sexes probably are simi-
larly situated with respect to it. The activities of both the male and
female participants can be deterred equally under the statute,
since usually both participants willingly consent to the activity.242
Moreover, that only females can become pregnant should not be
dispositive since this difference can be easily removed through the
exercise of the constitutional right of contraceptive use.243 In this
situation, both sexes are similarly situated and the statute, there-
fore, unconstitutionally discriminates against males.
d. Conclusion. Michael M. was incorrectly decided when ana-
lyzed in the light of existing case precedent. The state did not
demonstrate that a substantial relationship to an important gov-
ernmental objective existed; little, if any, evidence was offered.24
Moreover, by holding that great deference to legislative judgments
is required, the plurality opinion utilizes a rational basis test.245
The cases cited as support for this proposition were decided prior
to the present standard's adoption and are, thus, arguably inappli-
cable unless the Court intends to signal a retreat back to the ra-
tional basis test.
B. Rostker v. Goldberg24
The Military Selective Service Act2 47 (MSSA) empowers the
President to require every male between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six years to register for the draft.24 Registration was not
240. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
241. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
242. See MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 493 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. See upra note 226.
244. See supra notes 213-19 & 222-28 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
246. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
247. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
248. Section 3 of the MSAA reads:
1982]
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required between 1975 and 1980 until President Carter requested
the MSSA's reinstatment. 49 President Carter asked that the
MSSA be amended to include women, but Congress appropriated
monies sufficient only for male registration. 250 Resumption of the
draft registration reactivated a 1971 lawsuit challenging the con-
stitutionality of all-male draft registration. t On July 18, 1980, a
three-judge district court unanimously held that the all-male re-
gistration violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.252 Rostker, the Director of the Selective Service System,
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.253 The Supreme Court
reversed the district court, 6-3.254
1. The Court's Reasoning. Intermediate Scrutiny with Deference
to Congress
Citing a number of cases, the majority asserted that the doc-
trine of separation of powers requires the Court to extend great
deference to congressional decisions, especially when the constitu-
tionality of the MSSA had already been considered by Con-
gress. 255 The majority reasoned that the Court must afford even
greater deference to congressional decisions when reviewing legis-
lation passed under Congress' article I, section 8 war and military
powers. 6 This assertion is based on the belief that Congress is
more competent than the Court to render decisions in this area. 57
Moreover, the majority also referred to cases that support the
proposition that such deference has been extended where Con-
gress' military powers conflicted with an individual's constitu-
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, who, on the
day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at
such time and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by
proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1976), cited in 453 U.S. at 59.
249. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 60.
250. Id. at 60-61.
251. Id. at 61.
252. Id. at 63.
253. Id. at 64. A party may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the decision of
a three-judge district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
254. Rostker, id. at 83.
255. See, e.g., id. at 64 (citing Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 164 (1951); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)). See infra note 295 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these particular cases.
256. 453 U.S. at 64-65.
257. 453 U.S. at 64-65 (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). See infra
notes 296-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gilligan.
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tional rights. 25 8 Furthermore, the majority cautioned that "[iln
deciding the question before us we must be particularly careful not
to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Con-
gress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evalua-
tion by the Legislative Branch," although claiming to utilize the
Craig v. Boren standard of review.259
In its determination of whether all-male draft registration
serves an important governmental purpose, the majority stated
that a review of the statute's legislative history was not limited to
the first enactment of the MSSA in 1948.260 Rather, this review
would also include congressional discussions held when the stat-
ute was reactivated in 1980.261 The 1980 congressional hearings
and debates contained extensive discussion on the military conse-
quences of an all-male registration.262 This, the majority con-
cluded, distinguished the MSSA from statutes based on the
"accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about
females. 263
The majority then held that registration furthered an impor-
tant governmental purpose-the enlistment of combat troops. 264
They reasoned that the logical extension of draft registration
would be a draft itself.2 65 The Court held, drawing from the legis-
lative history of the MSSA reactivation, that Congress intended to
use any future draft to fill the need for combat troops.266 The ma-
jority concluded that "Congress' determination that the need
would be for combat troops if a draft took place was sufficiently
supported by testimony adduced at hearings so that the courts are
not free to make their own judgment on the question. ' 267 More-
over, in response to the district court's use of evidence from Senate
258. 453 U.S. at 66-67 (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); and Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)). See infra note 295 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these cases.
259. 453 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 74.
261. Id. at 74-75.
262. Id. at 72.
263. Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
264. Id. at 77.
265. "Any assessment of the congressional purpose and its chosen means must...
consider the registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of national emergency.
Any other approach would not be testing the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought
to achieve." Id. at 75.
266. Id. at 76-77 (citing S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 160 (1980), refprintedin
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2612, 2650).
267. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
hearings-which indicated that not all draftees would serve com-
bat duty26 8-the majority asserted that "the District Court...
palpably exceeded its authority when it ignored Congress' consid-
ered response to this line of reasoning. ' 269 The majority con-
cluded, therefore, that "[t]he purpose of registration . . . was to
prepare for a draft of combat troops.27
After determining the governmental objective for draft regis-
tration, the Court stated that a draft which exempts women "is not
only sufficiently, but closely related to Congress' purpose in au-
thorizing registration."' 27' Since women are limited by statute and
established military policy 272 to noncombat positions, the Court
reasoned that they should not be included in the pool of potential
combat troops. Thus, the sexes are not similarly situated with re-
gard to either draft registration or the draft itself.273 Gender-based
discrimination in this context is therefore plainly constitutional.274
The argument that a gender-neutral registration requirement
is as effective as the male-only registration requirement was dis-
missed. The Court held that the purpose of the registration was to
draft combat troops; therefore, a gender-neutral statute would
never be as effective because women are precluded from service in
combat.275 Furthermore, any military necessity for female regis-
tration is nonexistent because any noncombat positions needed
could be filled by either male draftees or female volunteers.276
The majority held that any inclusion of women in the system,
therefore, was merely based upon "consideration of equity"--a
factor which need not be considered by Congress when exercising
its article I, section 8 war and military powers.27 7 Finally, even if
all noncombat positions could not be filled by female volunteers,
the Court refused to require Congress to fill those positions by
drafting women. The Court reasoned that to do so would pre-
scribe a rigid division of the military into two groups-permanent
268. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 600 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 57
(1981).
269. 453 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 76.
271. Id. at 79.
272. Id. at 76.
273. Id. at 78.
274. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
275. 453 U.S. at 78.
276. Id. at 81 (citing S. REP. No. 826, supra note 266, at 158, reprinted in 1980, U.S.
CODE CONr. & AD. NEws at 2648).
277. Id. at 79-80 (citing S. REP. No. 826, supra note 266, at 158, reprintedin 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2648).
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combat and permanent support.27 This division would occur as
female draftees are statutorily barred from combat. 279
Like Michael M., the Rostker holding provoked heated dis-
sents. Justice White argued that Congress did not indicate its de-
sire to fill every position in the military with combat-ready men,
by pointing to the large numbers of female volunteers.280 Existing
volunteers could not possibly staff all noncombat positions during
a mobilization and thus the use of women in these positions would
not threaten either military flexibility or combat readiness. 281
Justice Marshall agreed that raising and supporting an army is
an important governmental objective. 282 He disagreed, however,
that in a military context the standard of review should be differ-
ent.283 The Court, not Congress, determines the governmental ob-
jective's relationship to the statute, and here it is insufficient to
support the exclusion of women.284 The government never con-
tended that the exclusion of women from diaft registration is re-
lated to military effectiveness. Indeed, military experts agree that
women have made significant contributions to the Armed Serv-
ices.285 Moreover, if exclusion of women from combat is desirable
and constitutional, such exclusion has already been achieved.286
It is not necessary, therefore, to utilize the registration statute as
part of the overall exclusion plan.287
2. Analysis of the Majority's Reasoning: Misapplication of the
Intermediate Scrutiny Test
Although the majority purported to follow the Craig v. Boren
standard of review, it misapplied that test. Rostker was not a situ-
ation2 88 where the Court should have accorded deference to legis-
lative determinations. 8 9 If the majority had independently
reviewed the evidence, it would have concluded that the purpose
of registration was not limited to raising exclusively combat
278. Id. at 82 (citing S. REP. No. 826, supra note 266, at 158, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2648).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 84-86.
282. Id. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
283. Id. at 89-90.
284. Id. at 90.
285. Id. at 90-91.
286. Id. at 93.
287. Id.
288. See infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
289. See infra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
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troops,"' and that an all-male registration is not substantially re-
lated to the actual purpose of draft registration.291
a. Deference to Congress. The Court again acknowledged, as
it had in Michael M, that it owes great deference to congressional
decisions.292 The Court warned against substituting its independ-
ent evaluation of the evidence for that of Congress.293 By so do-
ing, the Court implicitly approved a rational basis standard.
Under the existing standard of review, the district court was re-
quired to independently evaluate the evidence.294 Furthermore,
the Court's support for the asserted deference is questionable.
Those cases cited were either decided prior to the present rule ex-
pressed in Craig or are factually distinguishable from the cases
cited in Rostker.295
Arguably, care should be exercised whenever the Court re-
290. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
291. See infra notes 306-21 and accompanying text.
292. 453 U.S. at 64.
293. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
294. In Craig v. Boren, for example, the state presented a great deal of evidence to
prove that teenage males were more likely to become involved in automobile accidents
than teenage females. The majority in that case simply did not believe the evidence was
substantial. 429 U.S. at 200-04.
295. See 453 U.S. at 64-67. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) involved the con-
stitutionality of taxing inter vivos gifts. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) involved alleged first amendment violations arising from a
television network's refusal to sell broadcast time to air certain political views. This dis-
pute never directly involved congressional legislation. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) concerned constitutional violations in designating certain
organizations as Communist without notice or hearing.
Most of the cases cited as support for the argument that deference must be accorded
decisions made pursuant to Congress' war and military powers did not involve gender-
based discrimination. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) rejected the claim of an in-
subordinate soldier that the Uniform Code of Military Justice was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. Such a rejection appears reasonable in light of "It]he fundamental neces-
sity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline" required in
the military. Id. at 758. Both Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) and Brown v. Glines,
444 U.S. 348 (1980) upheld restrictions on political speeches made by civilians on a military
base and the right of military personnel to petition for redress of grievances, respectively.
These restrictions were justified by the Court because of the potential "danger to the loy-
alty, discipline, or morale of troops" which results from such actions. 424 U.S. at 840.
Rosiker does not present the same type of threats or substantial disruptions in military
effectiveness. The presence of females in the military is an established fact and their posi-
tive impact in the military is well documented. Only Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) involved sex discrimination in a military context. In this case the Court upheld
discriminatory mandatory discharge procedures because the statutuory proscription of wo-
men from combat made the sexes not similarly situated for promotions. See supra notes
93-98 and accompanying text. Ballard may be distinguishable from the present case, how-
ever, because the sexes arguably are similarly situated under draft registration. See infra
notes 309-21 and accompanying text.
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views military matters. Forcing the government to bear a heavy
burden, as an alternative to facially discriminatory action, could
seriously threaten national security. For this reason the Court re-
iterated that
2 96
[i]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle,
and professional decisions as to composition, training, equip-
ping, and control of a military force are essentially professional
military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.2 9
7
This case, however, involves neither an undesirable burden on
the government, nor an area of judicial incompetence. Although
the legislative branch expressed opposition to universal registra-
tion, the executive branch--that part of the government responsi-
ble under the MSSA for administering the system-obviously did
not feel burdened by including women in the system.2 98 More-
over, the evidence considered by the district court in striking down
the all-male system, was not discovered through independent in-
vestigation. Rather, the evidence came from testimony given by
members of the executive branch29 9-- the competent "civilian con-
trollers" making professional military judgments."°° Any poten-
tial danger to national security which justifies a deferential review,
therefore, arguably does not exist.3"'
b. Important Governmental Interests Test. The Court found
that the purpose of the all-male registration system is to raise only
combat troops. 3 2 The majority did not feel free to engage in an
independent evaluation of the evidence. Such an investigation,
which was performed by the district court, revealed that not all
draftees would be placed in combat or combat-ready positions.
296. 453 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)).
297. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10 (emphasis in original).
298. It was President Carter who first advanced the proposition regarding a gender-
neutral registration.
299. See generally 453 U.S. at 76-82.
300. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
301. Furthermore, to strike the all-male system does not violate Chief Justice Mar-
shall's fundamental command in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819):
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
Id. at 421. Rostker does not involve a judicial determination that the particular constitu-
tional means are unwise and that more effective means could have been chosen. Rather, the
all-male system violates an express constitutional provision and, therefore, is not a "means
... consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution."
302. 453 U.S. at 76.
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Evidence before the district court demonstrated that during the
first six months of military mobilization, the government would
have a minimum of 80,000 noncombat positions which could be
advantageously filled by female inductees. °3 These figures were
not computed by the district court but by the Department of De-
fense.3 4 The actual purpose of draft registration, therefore, is not
limited to raising combat troops. The MSSA itself states that
"[An adequate armed strength must be achieved and maintained
to ensure the security of this Nation. '3 5 Any evidence which at-
tempts to show a substantial relationship between excluding fe-
males and furthering the goals of draft registration--the security
of the nation-must be viewed with that objective in mind.
c. Substantial Relationshp Test. The government was re-
quired to prove that the exclusion of women from registration was
substantially related to the maintenance of a strong military.0 6
Moreover, a gender-neutral registration system has to be proven
less effective than male-only registration 30 7 and proven by specific
evidence.308 The government failed to meet this burden.
In finding any gender-neutral registration system less effective
than the existing all-male system, 309 the Court incorrectly as-
sumed that all draftees would be placed in combat-ready posi-
tions.310 The Department of Defense claimed that 80,000 jobs
could be filled by female draftees. 311 In fact, one reason the ad-
ministration supported female registration is that women can best
303. 509 F. Supp. at 600.
304. Id.
305. 50 U.S.C.App. § 451(b) (1976).
306. See supra notes 127-51 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
309. 453 U.S. at 77.
310. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text. Not all Congressmen agree that
the purpose of draft registration is to raise only combat troops, as the majority apparently
believed:
In time of mobilization ... it may be necessary to significantly expand the size of
our forces in a very short period of time. The requirements for combat soldiers
will be high, but so will the requirements for the large numbers of military per-
sonnel who fill noncombat roles ....
The subcommittee's findings are fatally flawed because they erroneously focus
on the assignment of women to combat and fail to address approved plans for the
use of women to meet "noncombat mobilization requirements." The assignment
of women to combat roles is an issue that unnecessarily clouds the central issue of
how the nation can best meet its personnel requirements in lime of mobilization.
S. REp. No. 826 supra note 266, at 241, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2664-65 (statement of Sen. Cohen) (emphasis added).
311. 453 U.S. at 81.
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fill some specific positions.312 Women could be drafted to fill
those positions, thereby freeing the males to do those jobs for
which they are best suited. Thus, universal conscription is not
merely as effective as the male-only system, it is arguably more
effective.
The Court further reasoned that since all positions could be
filled by male draftees or female volunteers, only notions of equity
would be served by universal registration.313 This assertion, how-
ever, is rebutted on three points. The "notions of equity" dis-
cussed by the majority are founded on the idea that there are
military jobs which women perform as well as men.314 Requiring
similarly situated persons to bear equally the burden of perform-
ing these jobs is precisely what equal protection demands. Fur-
thermore, it is immaterial whether all of these positions could be
filled by men. Opponents of a discriminatory classification need
not show that universal registration is more effective than male-
only registration; instead, the burden is on the government to
show the opposite. 5 Finally, the fact that volunteers would ade-
quately fill those positions for which women are qualified is not
dispositive. The purpose of registration is to operate as a hedge if
such positions are not filled through volunteers. 316 Regardless of
whether a draft would be needed to fill these positions, draft regis-
tration should be a necessary contingency. In fact, the Defense
Department had already acknowledged that such a need is a dis-
tinct possibility.317
312. 453 U.S. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting National Service Legislation:
Hearings on H. 6569 Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Con -
mittee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. J.A. 218 (1980) (Testimony of Asst. See'y of
Defense Pirie)).
313. 453 U.S. at 80.
314. 453 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
315. See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text.
316. 453 U.S. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Department of DefenseAuthorization
for Approprationsfor Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1688 (1980) (Testimony of Asst. See'y of De-
fense Danzig). Such an expectation is fully justified by history. Just before the Korean
War, the Government had unsuccessfully attempted to recruit 100,000 female volunteers to
meet rapidly expanding needs. Id. at 105 n.18 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 509 F. Supp. at
600 n.21 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, BACKGROUND STUDY-USE OF WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY at 3, 5 (2d ed. 1978)). Moreover, the recruitment of 80,000 female positions
would be in addition to the Government's present attempt to increase the number of women
in the military from 150,000 to 250,000 by 1985. Id. at 90 (citing Women in the Military:
Hearings Before the Military Personnel Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
96th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 13-23 (1979 and 1980) (testimony of Asst. See'y of Defense
Pine)).
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The majority accepted the congressional determination that
the inclusion of women would be detrimental to military flex-
ibility." 8 A mere assertion by the government, however, is insuffi-
cient.319 Moreover, that finding was premised on the assumption
that large numbers of women would be drafted.32 ° No determina-
tion was established regarding the effects on flexibility in the event
only a limited number of women were drafted.321 No evidence
exists, therefore, to indicate that drafting a limited number of wo-
men to fill noncombat positions hinders military flexibility.
d. Conclusion. In light of recent precedent,322 the deferential
standard of review used by the Court was inappropriate. The ma-
jority incorrectly relied on congressional assertions that draft re-
gistration only served the purpose of raising combat troops and
not to provide a strong military.323 Furthermore, the government
did not demonstrate that drafting a limited number of women
would hinder its objectives. Universal registration arguably
achieves that objective to an extent greater than the present sys-
tem.324 Thus, under the foregoing analysis the present law is
unconstitutional.
IV. CRITIQUE: IMPROPER RATIONAL BASIS ANALYSIS IN
GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. The Retreat to the Rational Basis Test
The pattern of decisions handed down in gender-based dis-
crimination cases over the last ten years is confusing. Some cases
appear to employ the deferential standard of the rational basis
test.325 Others use a standard requiring greater scrutiny than the
rational basis test but less than the strict scrutiny test.326 The cases
decided in the last five years, however, have established a consis-
318. Id. at 107.
319. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
320. "If the law required women to be drafted in equalnumbers with men, mobilization
would be severely impaired because of strains on training facilities and administrative sys-
tems." S. REP. No. 826, supra note 266, at 160, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 2650 (emphasis added).
321. See 453 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
322. See e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
323. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 306-21 and ar- mpanying text.
325. See supra notes 89-105 & 122-,.6 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 106-18 & 127-51 and accompanying text.
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tent approach which does not utilize the rational basis test.327 The
Court has not deviated from this recent pattern, despite assertions
to the contrary.328
The standard of review established in Craig v. Boren and its
progeny does not permit deference to legislative judgments; how-
ever, both Michael M and ]?ostker hold that such deference
should be extended.329 To prove that an important governmental
interest exists requires a statute or its legislative history to show
that the claimed objective was originally intended.330 An analysis
of the statutory rape statute in Michael ML and the MSSA in
Rosiker shows just the opposite.33' For the Court to find that a
gender-based classification is substantially related to the govern-
ment's objective, an independent determination of the existence of
that relationship and a demonstration that a gender-neutral classi-
fication is not equally effective is required.
332
Both Michael ML and Rostker uphold gender-based statutes
simply because a gender-neutral alternative is not more effec-
tive.333 Rostker specifically states that the Court should not sub-
stitute its own judgment for the legislature's evaluation of the
evidence.334 A test which defers to a governmental decision-mak-
ing body,335 accepts unsupported assertions notwithstanding a leg-
islative history which shows otherwise,3 36 upholds gender-based
classifications when gender-neutral statutes are equally effec-
tive,337 and fails to independently evaluate the evidence is a ra-
tional basis test notwithstanding the Court's assertions.338
This conclusion is reached in Justice Brennan's dissents in
Michael AL. 339 and Rostker.34° These particular dissents are sig-
nificant in light of Justice Brennan's notable contributions to in-
termediate scrutiny analysis in gender-based discrimination cases.
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 186-202 & 288-91 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 174-81, 255-63 & 267-69 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 203-21 & 302-05 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 129-51 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 222-30 & 306-24 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. 450 U.S. at 488-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
340. 453 U.S. at 85-86 (joining White, J., dissenting); and 453 U.S. at 86-113 (joining
Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion in Craig v.
Boren,34" ' the basis of the present standard of review.342 He has
also dissented in other gender-based classification cases where the
Court apparently applied a rational basis test.343 Thus, his refusal
to join the majority in either MichaelM orRostker casts doubt on
whether the intermediate scrutiny test was actually applied.
These two cases, therefore, create the same inconsistency in the
present test that Kahn v. Shevin and Schlesinger v. Ballard created
in the past.3 " Each case claims to follow precedent, yet neither
does so. Each serves as precedent in future cases which uphold
gender-based classifications through judicial deference to legisla-
tive determinations, and lowers the standard of review.345 Even-
tually, the Court could declare that the present doctrine has been
overruled sub silentio. This was the procedure utilized by the
Frontiero and Craig Courts.346
Under the present standard of review, the Court should not
use Michael M and Rostker as precedent. Their apparent use of
the rational basis test cannot be reconciled with the previously es-
tablished standard, which requires a higher degree of scrutiny.
Adoption of the Michael M /Rostker analysis indicates that the
Court has abandoned the Craig v. Boren rule, and retreated to the
deferential approach of the rational basis test.347
B. Gender-Based Discrimination and the Rational Basis Test.
The End of Equal Protection?
Any future Supreme Court application of the rational basis
test to gender-based discrimination cases would effectively elimi-
nate constitutional equal protection of the sexes. This possibility
is apparent from past gender-based discrimination cases decided
under the rational basis standard. The Supreme Court failed to
341. 429 U.S. at 190 (1976).
342. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. For other cases utilizing the Craig
v. Boren standard of review, see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 270-84 (1980); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. at 201-17 (1977) (Brennan plurality); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. at
637-53 (1975).
343. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 511-12 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 357-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
344. See supra notes 89-105 & 122-26 and accompanying text.
345. Id.
346. Though Reed v. Reed claimed to use the rational basis test, the plurality in Fron-
tiero looked to the Reed court for support and cited it as support for the claim that the
standard of review had changed. 411 U.S. at 683-84 (Brennan plurality). The same analy-
sis can be found in Craig, 429 U.S. at 203-04.
347. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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strike down a single statute involving gender-based discrimination
until 1971.348 Moreover, if Reed did in fact utilize a test requiring
greater scrutiny than the rational basis test,34 9 then no case has
ever struck down a gender-based classification under a rational
basis analysis.
This is a threat to equal protection for the sexes. Under a ra-
tional basis review nearly every one of the numerous cases de-
cided under an intermediate review would suffer the same fate.350
The decision in Craig v. Boren351 was based on an independent
judicial determination, after evaluating the state's evidence. 352
Under rational basis review the state is not required to prove the
statute's validity. The burden of proof is placed on the statute's
opponents,353 who must overcome a presumption that the statute
is constitutional. Thus, "any state of facts [that] reasonably can be
conceived [to] sustain [the statute] . . . at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed." 354 Furthermore, under a rational ba-
sis test the state need not show a substantial relationship between
statute and objective since it may not be struck down unless it is
"without any reasonable basis and is therefore arbitrary."3 55 Such
a reasonable basis did exist in Craig v. Boren. Evidence showed
that substantially more teenage males than females were arrested
for drunkenness and driving under the influence,356 because males
were more inclined to drink and drive than females.357 Since the
statute's claimed objective was to enhance traffic safety, 358 it was
reasonably related to that objective by seeking to reduce drunk
driving. The fact that the statute did not significantly further the
state's objective3 59 is irrelevant under a rational basis test.360 The
348. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Hull, Sex Discrimination and the
Equal Protection Clause, 30 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 639, 645 (1979).
349. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
350. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), a unanimous decision, would
probably have been upheld since those Justices that did not join the majority's intermediate
scrutiny analysis held that the statute failed rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 654-55 (Powell,
J., with Burger, CJ., concurring) ("I find no legitimate governmental interest. ); Id.
at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[lit is irrational to distinguish .... .
351. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
352. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
353. See supra text accompanying note 31.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 429 U.S. at 200 n.8.
357. Id. at 203 n.16.
358. Id. at 199.
359. See id. at 200-04.
360. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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Court in Craig, therefore, would have upheld the statute under
rational basis review.
The statutes challenged in Orr v. Orr361 and Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mutual Insurance Co. 362 would also have been upheld under
rational basis analysis. The statute in Orr was invalidated be-
cause a gender-neutral statute would have equally furthered the
state's objective in providing for needy spouses.3 63 The Wengler
decision held that mere assertions by the state of a substantial re-
lationship between objective and statute were insufficient to justify
gender-based discrimination. 3 4 The rational basis test affords the
state a "wide scope of discretion" in the exercise of its powers.3 65
Therefore, any determinations made by the legislature would be
entitled to great deference.366 Thus, the existence of gender-neu-
tral alternatives in Orr would be irrelevant, and the bare asser-
tions made in Wengler would be entitled to great deference.
The above analysis leads to but one conclusion. There is no
equal protection under a rational basis test because discriminatory
statutes are rarely invalidated.
C. The Needfor Heightened Scrutiny
Future rational basis analysis of gender-based classifications
by the Supreme Court would be ill-advised. Women as a group
have suffered a long history of agonizing discrimination. 36' This
disparate treatment is typically related not to ability, but to immu-
table characteristics of gender, "determined solely by the accident
of birth. ' 368 In short, most instances of gender-based discrimina-
tion simply cannot be justified. Rational basis review, however,
serves only to perpetuate the gross disparities between the sexes,
as demonstrated by the automatic validation of discriminatory
statutes under this standard.
The need for heightened scrutiny, however, goes beyond those
instances where the unfavorable treatment of women is direct and
facially obvious, such as lower-paying, lower-prestige jobs.
Heightened scrunity should also extend to those instances of gen-
361. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
362. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
363. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
365. See supra text accompanying note 31.
366. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
367. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (Brennan plurality).
368. Frntiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
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der-based discrimination which confer tangible benefits on wo-
men but are not intended to ameliorate past discriminatory
practices. Such "benefits" subtly discriminate against women
since they are premised on archaic sex-role stereotypes which de-
mean and imply inferiority. Female minors benefit under
Michael M., at the cost of upholding sexual stereotypes regarding
female virtue and their ability to make rational decisions with re-
spect to sexual activities. 36 9 The older drinking age for males in
Craig v. Boren rested on the stereotype of the "active
boy-adventurous, daring, even reckless [and] the passive
girl-docile, settled, submissive."370  The Social Security benefits
to widows in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld were allocated under the
assumption that females would stay home and raise families.371
The subtleness of these cases makes the discrimination more in-
sidious than more blatant instances of discrimination towards wo-
men. It is this subtleness which mandates a heightened standard
of review. The present intermediate scrutiny test allows the Court
to determine independently the actual purpose of a discriminatory
statute,372 and to strike it down if based upon an archaic stereo-
type.373 This result is not possible under rational basis review as
the Court is obligated to find some conceivable basis with which
to uphold the statute.374 Once such a basis is found, the statute,
with all of its stereotypes, is upheld.
CONCLUSION
The present standard of review in gender-based discrimination
cases requires the classification's supporters to prove empirically
that the classification is substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental objective.375 Such evidence is then independently eval-
uated by the Court.37s Notwithstanding what the Court claims,
Michael M. and Rostker do not utilize this standard of review.
Instead, the deferential stance taken in these cases implies the use
of a rational basis test.377 The implicit message of these cases is .
that the Court will no longer use the intermediate scrutiny test
369. 450 U.S. 464, 494-96 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
370. Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TuI. L. REv. 451, 469 (1978).
371. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
374. See supra text accompanying note 31.
375. See supra notes 75-151 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 106-18 & 148-51 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 325-46 and accompanying text.
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when reviewing gender-based discrimination cases. 378 The use of
a rational basis standard in this context is improper because it will
effectively preserve invidious discrimination against women.379
Rational basis review in gender-based discrimination cases is un-
wise and unwarranted. For the sake of judicial clarity and the
furtherance of equal treatment of the sexes, the Court should re-
turn to an intermediate scrutiny standard.
GEORGE S. CRISCI
378. See supra text accompanying note 347.
379. See supra notes 348-74 and accompanying text.
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